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SQUARE PEGS IN A ROUND HOLE? THE EFFECTS OF
THE 2006 CAPE TOWN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
AND ITS IMPACT ON FRACTIONAL JET OWNERSHIP
ANGIE BOLIVER*
T HE INCREASINGLY GLOBAL economy has led to a variety
of attempts to smooth financial transactions across interna-
tional borders. One recent attempt has centered on aircraft
transactions. However, while the initial goal was to improve in-
ternational transactions, questions remain as to its effect on the
domestic aviation industry within the United States.
The Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment,' more com-
monly known as the Cape Town Treaty ("Cape Town" or
"Treaty"), officially entered into force in the United States on
March 1, 2006.2 Adopted on November 16, 2001, the Treaty be-
gan at a diplomatic conference held in Cape Town, South Af-
rica. Technically, the Treaty consists of two parts: "(1) the
Convention itself, which is drafted in general terms to deal with
commercial transactions involving mobile equipment, and (2)
* Angie Boliver is aJD candidate for the class of 2008 at Southern Methodist
University Dedman School of Law. She holds a BA from Hardin Simmons
University and a MA from Southern Methodist University. She will be an
associate with Jones Day in the Fall of 2008.
1 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Spe-
cific to Aircraft Equipment, July 16, 2004, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-10, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm.
2 Susan Jaffe Roberts et al., International Secured Transactions and Insolvency, 40
INT'L LAW. 381, 388 (2006) (announcing the activation of the Cape Town Treaty
in the United States). See also Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment art. 49(1), Nov. 16, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-10 [hereinafter
"Cape Town Convention" or "Cape Town Treaty"] available at http://www.
unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm. See also Protocol to the Conven-
tion on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Air-
craft Equipment art. XXVIII(1), Nov. 16, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-10,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm [hereinaf-
ter Aircraft Protocol]. The Aircraft Protocol entered into force three months
following the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.
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the Protocol, which is specific to aircraft transactions."3 The
Treaty creates a new international registry where notices of
rights in aircraft and aircraft engines can be recorded to estab-
lish the priority of competing financial interests.4
One such economic burden not yet accounted for is the im-
pact of the Cape Town Treaty on corporate aircraft domestic,
especially fractional ownership programs. As their name indi-
cates, these programs allow parties to purchase only a portion of
an aircraft.5 Fractional ownership programs are "multi-year pro-
grams covering a pool of aircraft, most of which are owned by
more than one party and all of which are placed in a dry lease
exchange pool and available to any program participant. '"6
However, the Treaty was initially crafted with large commercial
aircraft and single whole aircraft transactions in mind.' The
original impetus for the Cape Town Treaty was a 1996 request
by the Boeing Company to the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation (LATA) to "seek assistance in 'breaking the logjam' in
Unidroit with a specific request that IATA propose a means of
moving forward with respect to aircraft equipment only," leaving
other forms of transportation to be addressed later.8 Unfortu-
nately, "later" has not yet come. As a result, the burgeoning in-
terest in fractional ownership aircraft, especially in the United
States, is somewhat at odds with the structure currently found in
the Treaty. Similarly, the registration requirements of the
Treaty are more burdensome for all aircraft, meaning that the
3 Frank L. Polk, Cape Town and Aircraft Transactions in the United States, 20 AiR &
SPACE LAW 4, 4 (2006) (discussing likely implications of Cape Town on the Amer-
ican domestic aviation industry).
4 Roberts, supra note 2, at 390. The registry for aircraft is administered by
Dublin-based Aviareto, a joint-venture between SITA SC and the Irish Govern-
ment that has contracted with International Civil Aviation Authority. Aviareto
Ltd., Aviareto, http://www.aviareto.aero/public/about.php (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
5 Eileen M. Gleimer, The Regulation of Fractional Ownership: Have the Wings of the
Future Been Clipped?, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 321, 323-24 (2002) (reviewing the frac-
tional jet ownership industry as a whole).
6 Id. at 324. Gleimer notes in footnote 9 that a "dry lease" means the "lease of
an aircraft where the crew is provided by the lessee." Id. at 324, n.9. See also
Philip E. Crowther, Taxation of Fractional Programs: "Flying Over Uncharted Waters,"
67J. AIR L. & COM. 241, 241 (2002) (discussing the tax implications of fractional
ownership programs).
7 Lorne S. Clark, The 2001 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mo-
bile Equipment and Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Internationalising Asset-Based Financing





domestic aviation industry is experiencing a struggle with imple-
mentation as well. In fact, it is possible that since the registra-
tion system under the Treaty is structured toward big
manufacturers and lenders, the complications for individual air-
craft sellers and dealers will ultimately prove to be too burden-
some, merely creating extra levels of bureaucracy that parties
will choose to circumvent. Several have already chosen to do
just that.
This Comment will explore both the impact of the recent im-
plementation of Cape Town on the American aircraft industry
in general, as well as the specific impact on fractional ownership
aircraft and the response of the industry. Part I will review the
history and intent leading up to the Treaty and provide a practi-
tioner's guide to navigating the new system. Part II will address
the fractional ownership industry. It will explore how other ar-
eas of law have adapted to and dealt with the fractional owner-
ship programs as a way to better understand how Cape Town
might eventually interact with fractional programs. Part III will
examine the Treaty's domestic impact since implementation, as
well as any benefits or growing pains realized to date. It will also
look at the current application of Cape Town to the fractional
ownership industry. Finally, Part IV will offer recommendations
of possible adjustments that could be made to the Treaty to ease
the transition into full implementation.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CAPE TOWN TREATY
In order to understand the Cape Town Treaty, it is necessary
to first look at events leading up to the Treaty. The Treaty was
the fruit of more than thirteen years of labor.9 Beginning in the
late 1980s, the Canadian government recommended that
Unidroit' explore possible ways of standardizing the laws for
security interests, specifically for mobile equipment." Over
9 Id. at 4.
10 Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit), About Unidroit,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2007). Unidroit is the French acronym for the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law, which is an independent intergovernmental organiza-
tion headquartered in Rome. Id. Initially part of the League of Nations,
Unidroit was re-established in 1940. Id. Its function is "to study needs and meth-
ods for modernising, harmonising and co-coordinating private and, in particular,
commercial law as between States and groups of States." Id.
II Sandeep Gopalan, Securing Mobile Assets: The Cape Town Convention and its
Aircraft Protocol, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 59, 60 (2003) (reviewing the
agreed-upon provisions in the Treaty).
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time, the effort grew to involve the combined efforts of multiple
parties including Unidroit, the Aviation Working Group, 12 the
International Air Transport Association' 3 and the International
Civil Aviation Organization.' 4 Co-chaired by Airbus and Boeing,
the Aviation Working Group membership includes major
figures such as Bombardier, Citibank, GE Capital Aviation, JP
Morgan, and Morgan Stanley. 5 The International Air Trans-
port Association is a global trade organization with more than
240 member airlines, representing 94 percent of the interna-
tional air traffic. 6 These groups represented interests of prima-
rily large commercial carriers, as evidenced by their member
lists of large aircraft carriers and financing groups. The primary
focus of the group was to "produce new treaty law governing
security interests in cross border transactions concerning high-
value mobile assets" specific to the aviation industry. 7
A. THE BIRTH OF THE CAPE TowN TREATY
In a nutshell, the desire for coordination and uniformity
within the aviation industry was financially driven. Specific fi-
nancial challenges accompany the sale or lease of expensive
equipment (such as airplanes and airplane parts) that can easily
move between countries.'" A key challenge "concerns the risk
and uncertainty in the securing of loans for the purchase [sic]
such equipment."1 9 Usually, potential creditors secure these
loans by getting an interest in the equipment as collateral.2 °
However, because this aviation equipment is highly mobile by its
very nature, often moving across national boundaries, the pro-
tection of that creditor's interest by a foreign jurisdiction is po-
12 Clark, supra note 7, at 4 n.8. The Aviation Working Group is a "not-for-
profit trade association representing aerospace manufacturers, air transport leas-
ing companies, and major financial institutions supporting the aviation industry."
Id.
13 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, Areas of Activity: Legal Services, http://www.iata.
org/whatwedo/policies-regulations/legal/index.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
14 Clark, supra note 7, at 4.
15 Id. at 4, n.8.
16 Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, About Us, http://www.iata.org/about (last visited
Sept. 28, 2007).
17 Clark, supra note 7, at 4.
18 Sean D. Murphy, Cape Town Convention on Financing of High-Value, Mobile
Equipment, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 852, 852 (2004) (discussing the expected benefits of





tentially limited.2' For example, the foreign jurisdiction may
favor local interests over those of the creditor.22 This is because
outside North America, many jurisdictions favor the law of lex
situs.23 So, when mobile equipment "acquire [s] a new situs, the
question arises as to whether the security interest created in the
first country has any effect in the second. ' 24 Because of this un-
certainty, the cost skyrockets for "aircraft financing in many
countries, which is reflected in the interest rate the financier
charges the debtor, or whether financing is available at all." 25
According to one international law scholar, "the disparity of na-
tional laws is contrary to the requirements of modern economy
and inimical to the development of international relations; a
uniform law is superior to a system of conflicts of law."' 26 While
this is an extreme view, there was a pervasive feeling at the con-
ference, in an era of increasingly global aviation transactions,
that standardization was more and more appealing.
These concerns highlighted the negotiations that took place
between the parties leading up to the 2001 conference held in
South Africa. The goal was to "establish an international legal
regime for the creation, perfection, and priority of security, title-
retention, and leasing interests in such equipment. '27 At the
end of the convention, twenty-two countries, including the
United States, signed the Treaty.28 Since 2001, of the signatory
21 Id.
22 Id. Similar concerns surround the leasing of equipment.
23 Gopalan, supra note 11, at 61.
24 Id.
25 Karan Bhatia, Assistant Sec'y for Aviation and Int'l Affairs, Address before
the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 2004) available at http://testi-
mony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/04test/Bhatia1.htm.
26 Gopalan, supra note 11, at 80 (quoting Marc Ansel, From the Unification of
Law to its Harmonization, 51 TUL. L. Ruv. 108 (1976)).
27 Murphy, supra note 18, at 852. The convention officially concerns "three
types of equipment: aircraft equipment, railway rolling stock, and outer space
assets." Id. at 852-53. The aircraft protocol (including airframes, aircraft en-
gines, and helicopters above a certain size) went into effect at the same time as
Cape Town. Id. at 853. The other two protocols have yet to become active, while
officials continue to negotiate their terms. Id.
28 Roy Goode, The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment: A Driving Force for International Asset-Based Financing, 2002-2 UNIF. L. REV. 3, 3
(2002), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equip-
ment/depositaryfunction/ information/overview.pdf. Sir Roy Goode is Head of
the United Kingdom Delegation, Emeritus Professor of Law at University of Ox-
ford, and served as Chairman of the Conference Drafting Committee. Id. at 3
2007] 533
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
countries, fifteen (Angola, Afghanistan, Kenya, Mongolia, South
Africa, Ethiopia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Se-
negal, Columbia, Panama, and the United States) have ratified
the Treaty.29 Drafters anticipated that the Convention would
have a positive impact on the global economy, benefiting both
well-developed and under-developed economies. For example,
supporters note that "countries with inadequate legal regimes
struggle to raise capital from overseas lenders who may be anx-
ious regarding protection of their security interests .... Accord-
ingly, an improvement in the legal system may increase lender
activity. '' 30 But what has been the effect in the United States?
B. INCORPORATION INTO THE UNITED STATE'S EXISTING SYSTEM
Prior to ratification, the United States "amended many U.S.
laws to comply with the Treaty (e.g. [,] Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, Title 49 of the United States Code, and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code)."" The Cape Town Treaty Implementation Act
was adopted by Congress in June of 2004, was signed into law in
August 2004,32 and finally entered into force in March 2006.
The delay of full implementation can be explained, in part, be-
cause "technical amendments to legislation regulating the Fed-
eral Aviation Authority were necessary for that authority to
implement its functions under the Convention and protocol.
33
For example, the United States now allows the registration of
"slightly less powerful engines with the FAA's Civil Aircraft Reg-
istry (FAA Registry), as well as for notices of prospective interest
in aircraft or aircraft engines, which are eligible for recording
under the Cape Town Convention."34 The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) authorization also changed to being op-
tional for aircraft engines. 5
29 Arturo Weiss, Cape Town Forum Updates Operators, AVtATION INT'L NEWS, Apr.
1, 2007, available at http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/
cape-town-forum-updates-operators/?no_cache= 1&cttash=c0e5864313.
30 Gopalan, supra note 11, at 66.
31 Greg Reigel, GlobalAir.com, The Cape Town Convention, http://www.
globalair.com/discussions/legal-services/article-/msglD=113 (last visited Sept.
28, 2007).
32 Murphy, supra note 18, at 854.
33 Id.
34 Lorraine B. Halloway, International Transportation, 39 INT'L LAW. 417, 422
(2005) (detailing the latest developments in international law).




Significantly, one question remained as to how the Treaty
would affect liens or interests that were perfected before March
2006. The United States deliberately chose not to affect these
interests, but rather adopted the Treaty so that perfected inter-
ests would be grandfathered in under the Treaty, fully intact. 6
However, one commentator notes that some lenders may prefer
to register a lien under the Treaty.-7 This means that parties
who have interests perfected prior to March 2006, but who want
to take advantage of the Treaty, now have to register as a new
international interest, as opposed to registering under their
original interest." To comply, parties should "enter into new
documents... probably in the form of a second priority lien or
an amended and restated agreement, and register that interest
at the [International Registry]."3
According to Unidroit's official "Overview of the Conven-
tion," the Convention and supporting Protocols were created
with five basic objectives in mind:
* To create an international interest,4 ° recognized by all Con-
tracting States;
" To offer the creditor a "range of basic default remedies"; ad-
ditionally, if evidence of default is found, to offer the creditor
a process for fast "interim relief' while awaiting final resolu-
tion of the claim;
" To create an 'electronic international register' for interna-
tional interests (the international registry should give notice
to all parties and give the registrant first-in-time priority);
* To meet the specific needs of the particular industry segment
contained in each of the Protocols; and
" To encourage creditors to extend credit, improve credit rat-
ings and lower risk and costs for all parties of the
transaction."
Professor Goode also points out that the Convention provides
for protection of five different categories of interest: (1) interna-




40 Thomas Gillespie, Cape Town Convention Changes Rules of Aircraft Purchase and
Finance, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, June 2, 2006, available at http://www.mondaq.
com/article.asp?articleid=40202 (noting that "International Interests include se-
curity interests, leasehold interests, conditional sales agreements, ownership in-
terests evidenced by bill of sale . . . and some nonconsensual liens, as well as
amendments, assignments, and subordinations related to International
Interests").
41 Goode, supra note 28, at 4.
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tional interests, (2) prospective international interests, (3) na-
tional interests, "(4) [n]on-consensual rights or interests arising
under national law and given priority without registration ...
[and] (5) [r]egisterable non-consensual rights or interests aris-
ing under national law."42
Financially speaking, the Treaty "adopts the United States as-
set-based financing concepts reflected in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) as the international standard in this area. 4 3
The Treaty expands this system into countries of the world
whose existing systems of commercial law have historically been
problematic in aircraft transactions due to their inherent credit
challenges.4" More specifically, the Treaty "establishes an 'inter-
national interest' which is a secured credit or leasing interest
with defined rights in a piece of equipment. . . .consist[ing]
primarily of 1) the ability to repossess or sell or lease the equip-
ment in case of default; and 2) the holding of a transparent fi-
nance priority in the equipment. '" 5
C. THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRY
The establishment of the International Registry (Registry) is
at the heart of the Treaty and its goals. For the United States,
the Registry means that since the March 2006 activation, an ex-
tra step has been added in the searching and filing require-
ments that attend perfecting ownership and lien interests."6
The FAA operates a Civil Aviation Registry (the FAA Mike
Monroney Aeronautical Center) in Oklahoma City. It is a well-
established system that is responsible "for developing, maintain-
ing, and operating national programs for the registration of
United States civil aircraft and certification of airmen."47 The
Civil Aviation Registry is "a comprehensive registry that func-
tions not only as the entity that establishes the nationality of a
U.S. aircraft... [but] it also operates a system for the recording
and full documentation of certain security interests in U.S. civil
aircraft, engines and spare parts. '"48 Through this system, the
42 Id. at 6.
43 Halloway, supra note 34, at 421.
44 Id.
45 Murphy, supra note 18, at 853.
46 Polk, supra note 3, at 4.
47 Fed. Aviation Admin., Flight Standards Service-Civil Aviation Registry,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters-offices/avs/offices/afs/afs
700/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
48 Bhatia, supra note 25.
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FAA is the official "entry point" into the International Registry.4 9
In other words, once an owner registers through the usual FAA
registry, the FAA provides an International Registry code so the
new owner can then file his interest with the Cape Town Inter-
national Registry.5" As part of the ratification, the United States
mandated that the "FAA Registry must authorize filings with the
International Registry [for] U.S. registered aircraft, aircraft en-
gines, and notices of prospective interest in aircraft that have
received a U.S. identification number."'" The International
Registry is "a 24-hour a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, first-
to-file electronic registry established to implement the Conven-
tion regime.... For the purposes of this provision (and certain
other provisions) of the Convention, the term 'registration' in-
cludes 'an amendment, extension or discharge of a registra-
tion. ' "52
The "first-to-file" aspect is a significant differentiating factor
of the Treaty. Essentially, once a creditor files an international
interest with the Registry so that it becomes searchable, his inter-
est has priority over all other interests, superseding both subse-
quent registries and all interests that remain unregistered.53
This changes the historical United States priority rule that states
"the first to file a security interest at the FAA Registry has prior-
ity over all other liens against the aircraft or engine unless the
filing party has 'actual notice' of another claim or right in the
aircraft or engine."5 4 This change puts the onus directly on the
purchaser/owner/lessor to register or risk losing its interest, re-
gardless of actual notice.55 The creation of the International
Registry involved lengthy negotiations, largely because the air-
lines, heavily supported by the Aviation Working Group, lobbied
for a system that would be "simple, efficient and inexpensive."56
However, the extent to which the Registry is proving to fulfill
these goals for United States interests (especially fractional in-
terests) remains to be seen.
49 Murphy, supra note 18, at 853.
50 Polk, supra note 3, at 6.
51 Halloway, supra note 34, at 422.
52 Clark, supra note 7, at 9 (quoting Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, art.
16, para. 3).
53 Murphy, supra note 18, at 853.
54 Polk, supra note 3, at 6.
55 Id.
56 Clark, supra note 7, at 9.
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The scope of the Treaty is also key to understanding the mag-
nitude of its impact on American aviation. The Treaty restricted
itself to equipment that had high value and consisted of an in-
ternational interest, complete with the formalities that accom-
pany such an interest.5 7 Additionally, while the debtor must be
in a contracting country when the agreement is final, the credi-
tor's location is irrelevant.5 The Cape Town Treaty applies to
"aircraft objects" which cover the following items: (1) airplanes
that are "type-certified to transport at least eight persons (in-
cluding crew)" or goods of more than 2,750 kilograms, (2) heli-
copters type certified to "transport at least five persons
(including crew)" or goods of more than 450 kilograms, (3) or
aircraft engines of at least 550 horsepower or the equivalent of
1,750 pounds of thrust, "if at the time of the underlying transac-
tion the aircraft is registered in a Contracting State or if the
debtor is situated in a Contracting State."59 Under these rules,
aircraft and engines require separate filings. A twin-engine air-
craft, therefore, requires three separate registrations. While
much of the Treaty is aimed at large single-craft transactions,
the scope, regulations and requirements of the Treaty are less




Fractional ownership programs, which began in the late 1980s
(ironically around the same time that talks leading to the Treaty
began), have grown significantly since Executive Jet Aviation
launched its NetJets initiative as the first fractional ownership
program.60 As a fractional owner, an individual or company
buys an interest (generally one-eighth or more) and co-owns the
aircraft with other fractional owners. 61 Because scheduling con-
flicts are sure to arise between multiple owners of one craft, the
57 Gopalan, supra note 11, at 70. Gopalan argues that an international interest
could mean either "(1) an interest granted under a security agreement; (2) an
interest vested in a conditional seller under a title reservation agreement; or (3)
an interest vested in a lessor under a leasing agreement." Id.
58 Id.
59 Reigel, supra note 31.
60 Eileen M. Gleimer, The Convenience and Confusion Associated with Corporate Air-
craft Operations, 12 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3, 5 (1998) (considering implications of
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fractional owners "enter into a type of interchange agreement
pursuant to which the owners agree to make their aircraft availa-
ble to the other participants in the program. 62 The end result
is comparable to timeshare programs used by resorts.63
A. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF FRACTIONAL
OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
Historically, corporate aviation branched out of commercial
aviation and quickly increased in popularity. The FAA recog-
nized this rapidly growing field and adopted a new subpart in
Part 9164 of their regulations in 1972 that "afforded aircraft own-
ers the potential to recoup a portion of their investment by
spreading the cost of the aircraft, [thus] business aircraft be-
came available to entities that did not need full time use of air-
craft."65 As far as the FAA was concerned, cost sharing was
allowed as long as the aircraft did not engage in common car-
riage." As corporate aviation continued to expand, more grow-
ing pains began to show. Sharing a plane or chartering ajet did
not always provide the ready access that companies desired.6 7
Many wanted the immediate accessibility of wholly owning their
own aircraft, but they did not use the plane enough to justify the
62 Id. See also Crowther, supra note 6, at 251 (noting that economically, "the
primary advantage of a fractional program is that aircraft utilization can be in-
creased significantly. Once a flight is completed, the aircraft does not have to be
flown deadhead back to the home base. Instead, the aircraft is simply flown to
where the next customer is located").
63 Kenneth P. Krohn, Fractional Ownership and Timeshare Programs: Are They Sub-
ject to the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, 54 Bus. LAw.
1181, 1184 (1999) (comparing both aircraft fractional ownership programs and
resort property timeshare programs under the securities acts).
64 Kristen A. Bell, Comment, Where Do They Fit? Fractional Ownership Programs
Wedged into Current Air Law Decisions and Guidelines, 69 J. AIR L. & CoM. 427, 431
(2004) (discussing recent cases and their effect on developing law relating to
fractional ownership programs). Bell notes that Part 91 provisions relate to pri-
vate owners while Part 135 provisions cover "common carriers." Id. Part 135 con-
tains additional restrictions regulating airport use, flight crews and the aircraft
itself. Id.
65 Eileen M. Gleimer, When Less Can Be More: Fractional Ownership of Aircraft -
The Wings of the Future, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 979, 982-83 (1999) (discussing the
expanding industry of fractional ownership programs). The new Part 91 subpart
rules imposed additional requirements for large and multi-engine turbine-pow-
ered aircraft "to ensure a higher level of safety, and at the same time, eliminated
many of the administrative, financial and organizational requirements imposed
on commercial operators that were purely economic in nature." Id. at 983.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 984.
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expense of buying an entire plane.68 Executive Jet Aviation ad-
dressed the needs of these parties in 1986 with the debut of
NetJets and offered fractional "interests in a fleet of eight
Cessna Citation II aircraft. ' 69 Within ten years, NetJets had
grown to a fleet of almost 100 aircraft and 700 owners, and
other players were entering the lucrative fractional ownership
industry. 0
Fractional programs involve responsibilities for both the frac-
tional owner and the managing company.71 The following de-
scribes a typical NetJets transaction, although this interaction is
typical of most fractional programs. A fractional owner generally
must sign multiple contracts to finalize his interest, as well as to
fully understand and agree to the responsibilities that accom-
pany participation in the program.72 For example, in order to
join the program, the owner obviously must agree to share his
fraction of available flight times with other fractional owners so
that each owner can fly when he or she chooses. 7' Additionally,
fractional owners enter into a number of agreements including
a Purchasing Agreement, an Owners Agreement, a Master In-
terchange Agreement, and a Management Agreement.74
Each of these agreements plays an important role in the frac-
tional ownership program. The Purchase Agreement provides
68 Id.
69 Id. See also Anthony Bianco, What's Better Than a Private Plane? A Semiprivate
Plane, Bus. WK., July 21, 1997, at 57 (highlighting the successful NetJets enter-
prise, the reporter notes that it "is broadening the market for private jets by sell-
ing them at a fraction of the prices offered by manufacturers .... But the real
beauty of NetJets is that fractional owners don't have to wait their turn or put up
with group travel.").
70 Gleimer, supra note 65, at 985. Early competitors included FlexJets
(launched by Business JetSolutions, a company jointly owned by Bombardier,
Inc. and AMR Combs Inc., American Airlines' charter affiliate) and a fractional
program offered through Travel Air, a subsidiary of Raytheon Aircraft Company.
Id.
71 Bell, supra note 64, at 429.
72 Id.
73 Id. See also Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463,
1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (describing the contractual process accompanying
NetJet's fractional ownership program as part of its decision regarding the appli-
cation of tax laws to the program).
74 Bell, supra note 64, at 429. Owners also must agree "to be severally liable for
the costs of operating the aircraft and the owners sign a 'lease' that allows each
owner to use another's aircraft on an as-needed basis." Id.
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the sale's terms and conditions. 75 This includes the "purchase
price, closing date, delivery conditions, and representations and
warranties. '76 The Purchase Agreement should "specify that the
customer is acquiring a specific percentage or fraction of the
ownership interests in the aircraft, and that the customer will
hold its interest as a tenant-in-common with all other persons
possessing ownership interests in the aircraft. ' 77 The Agree-
ment differs from most other aircraft purchase contracts in that
it "will likely include provisions to require and facilitate the re-
purchase of the aircraft ownership interest by the fractional pro-
gram at some later date, as well as substantial restrictions on the
customer's right to sell or otherwise transfer the ownership in-
terest to any party other than the fractional program. ' 78 Frac-
tional owners should carefully review the Purchase Agreement
because provisions can include "caps on the repurchase price,
'remarketing' fees, and the methods and assumptions used to
determine the fair market values of program aircraft. '79 How-
ever some fractional ownership programs offer customer protec-
tions against excessive risk by outlining a minimum price the
program will pay for a repurchased interest. 80
The Management Agreement is arguably the most compre-
hensive of the agreements. 81 As opposed to the Purchase Agree-
ment, the Management Agreement details the party's ownership
interest, the usage rights of the aircraft, and all flight services
charges.82 In addition, it covers issues ranging from monthly
fees charged, to geographical coverage permitted, to catering
services provided. The Ownership Agreement isan agreement
75 Troy A. Rolf, The Coming of Age of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Programs, 15





79 Id. at 12.
80 Id. In most instances under this protection, the "customer will qualify for
the protection only when trading in its ownership interest for an equal or greater
percentage interest in a newer aircraft of equal or greater value." Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. Other issues included in the agreement may include:
general management and administration of the aircraft and aircraft
records; the fractional program's obligations to inspect and main-
tain the aircraft and to furnish trained and qualified pilots for all
flights; ... ferrying and miscellaneous charges; minimum charges
for use of program aircraft; upgrade-downgrade rights;. . .excise
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among the various fractional owners of the aircraft themselves
and outlines the costs and responsibilities shared among the
parties.8 4 Finally, the Interchange Agreement between all of the
fractional program's customers "serves as a lease, pursuant to
which each owner of a fractional interest in an aircraft agrees to
lease its interest in the aircraft, from time to time and on an as
needed basis, to each other owner of a fractional interest in an
aircraft managed by the fractional program. 8 5
As part of a fractional program such as NetJets, fractional
owners also "contract for the services of a common management
company that administers the interchange and provides the sup-
port necessary to facilitate the operation of the aircraft by an
owner."8 6 Under the Management Agreement, the manage-
ment company agrees to certain responsibilities for a monthly
program manager fee. 7 These include exterior and interior
maintenance, payment of fuel and flight crews, storage, provi-
sion of liability insurance, and compliance with FAA record and
flight log requirements. 88
B. FAA's CLASSIFICATION OF FRACTIONAL
OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
Because fractional ownership programs inhabit the gray area
between private owners of whole aircraft and commercial carri-
ers, these programs have presented a challenge as to where they
fit in the corpus of aviation law since their inception. 89 As men-
tioned above, fractional ownership programs have historically
been categorized under Part 91 of the FAA's Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR).90 Under the FAR, aircraft are generally clas-
sified as either: (1) private aircraft, (2) charter aircraft or (3)
taxes; the number of hours of use of program aircraft to which the
customer is entitled; operational control of program aircraft; substi-
tution of ownership interests; and the types and amounts of insur-
ance coverages that the fractional program provides.
Id.
s4 Id. at 14. The fractional ownership program itself is generally not a party to
the Agreement, although they usually provide the form of the Agreement. Id.
85 Id.
86 Gleimer, supra note 65, at 984.
87 Bell, supra note 64, at 430.
88 Id. The management company also synchronizes flight schedules per the
Interchange Agreement and may be responsible for federal taxes. Id.
89 Id.
9o Gleimer, supra note 65, at 984.
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airline aircraft.9 ' As a general matter, "[p] rivate aircraft are typi-
cally operated under Part 91 of the [FARs], charter aircraft are
typically operated under Part 135, and airline aircraft are typi-
cally operated under Part 121."92 This caused some controversy
for the air taxi operators operating under Part 135 who believed
that "fractional ownership programs have an unfair economic
advantage due to their ability to operate under Part 91."13
Due to such arguments and following the growth and expan-
sion of the industry, the FAA reexamined that classification in
1996.94 They focused primarily on the question of "operational
control" and whether that control lay with the fractional owner
or with the management company.95 The FAA's Fractional
Ownership Aviation Rulemaking Committee (The Committee)
determined that fractional owners "share more of their regula-
tory characteristics with the owners of non-commercially
operated aircraft than with passengers using on-demand
operators. "06
Following that review, the Committee determined that a new
Subpart (k) should be added under Part 91 to "define and gov-
ern fractional ownership operations."97 By locating the program
under Part 91, the FAA made "commercial purpose" of the air-
craft the distinguishing factor between Part 91 and Part 135,
while still recognizing the differences between whole and frac-
tional owners by locating it under Subpart (k).8 Under Subpart
(k), clearly articulated roles are laid out for the fractional owner
and the program manager.99 Additionally, it provides "for the
joint and several responsibility of the owner and program man-
91 Crowther, supra note 6, at 244.
92 Id. Crowther notes that an aircraft owner would "generally prefer to operate
under Part 91, since there are fewer requirements and limitations regarding the
operation of the aircraft. However, a Part 91 operator also cannot transport
others for compensation or hire." Id.
93 Gleimer, supra note 5, at 329.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 330. If the operational control had been found to fall to the program
manager, the fractional ownership programs would have been governed under
Part 135 (the same part regulating air taxi operators). Id.
96 Bell, supra note 64, at 433 (quoting Regulation of Fractional Aircraft Owner-
ship Programs and On-Demand Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,520, 37,522 (Jul. 19,
2001)).
97 Rolf, supra note 75, at 15.
98 Bell, supra note 64, at 433. As a result of Subpart (k), fractional ownership
"arrangements such as time-sharing, interchange, and joint ownership arrange-
ments" are allowed to stay "under the less stringent guidelines of Part 91." Id.
99 Id. at 434.
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ager for the safe operation of the flight and for compliance with
the FARs."'1
C. APPLICATION OF GENERAL AVIATION LAWS TO FRACTIONAL
OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
The Cape Town Treaty is not the first time that the law and
fractional ownership programs had to find a way to coexist de-
spite incompatible traits. Because fractional ownership pro-
grams are relatively new and relatively distinctive (as compared
to more conventional aviation systems), other bodies of law have
had to adapt to the fractionals' singular needs. Reviewing how
other laws have adapted gives some insight into ways that Cape
Town can adapt to the needs of fractional ownership programs.
1. Tax Law Adaptations
While the Subpart (k) classification helped define fractional
ownership programs, other areas of law continued to have chal-
lenging relationships with such programs.0 1 One such area
concerned the tax laws. 1°2 Payment of taxes turned on a distinc-
tion between commercial and non-commercial flights after the
1970 enactment of the Airport and Airway Revenue Act.'
While commercial flights had to pay an air transportation tax,
non-commercial flights were only subjected to fuel taxes. 10 4 The
Internal Revenue Code "defines 'noncommercial aviation' as
,any use of an aircraft, other than the use in a business of trans-
porting persons or property for compensation or hire by
air.' "105
When determining whether "the use of an aircraft should be
considered a taxable transportation service, the IRS relies on the
100 Id. at 434-35.
101 Id. at 430. See also Krohn, supra note 63, at 1182-1224 (evaluating the im-
pact of securities laws on fractional aircraft ownership).
102 Crowther, supra note 6, at 243. The federal transportation tax is part of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and is codified in I.R.C. §§ 4261 et seq. (West
2002 & Supp. 2007). For a complete discussion of the full tax implications, see
generally Crowther, supra note 6 (discussing the complications that fractional
ownership programs cause in tax law classification and application).
103 Bell, supra note 64, at 435. See also Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219, 237
(1970).
104 Bell, supra note 64, at 435. See also Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United
States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
105 Bell, supra note 64, at 435. See also Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1465.
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'possession, command and control' test.'' °6 However, commen-
tators note that in recent rulings, the IRS has adopted the FAA
"concept of 'operational control' for determining who has 'pos-
session, command and control' of the aircraft."'' 7 In 1992, the
IRS issued a Technical Advice Memoranda'0 " regarding a frac-
tional ownership program and "concluded that the fractional
owners had relinquished 'possession, command and control' of
the program aircraft to the management company ('the tax-
payer')."1 °9 However, in that determination, the IRS admitted
that the owners were the title owners to the aircraft. 1 0 The IRS
holding of relinquishment was "clearly in conflict with the FAA's
latest decision to assume operational control of the aircraft in
the fractional owner."11 '
Following the IRS ruling, Executive Jet Aviation112 wanted the
courts to decide the matter. Unfortunately for Executive Jet Avi-
ation however, the courts agreed with the IRS "determination
that the private owners have relinquished 'possession, control
and command' and therefore held that the management com-
pany is subject to the federal [Airport and Airway Revenue Act]
tax for commercial flights."'"1 3 As part of an excise tax claim for
a refund, Executive Jet Aviation filed a claim on behalf of one of
their fractional owners, Texaco Air Services, Inc. (Texaco
Air). 14 Executive Jet Aviation and the IRS differed as to
whether Executive Jet should pay only IRS fuel taxes' 15 as a non-
commercial carrier, or should pay the air transportation tax 1"
as a commercial carrier. 117 The Court of Appeals considered
106 Crowther, supra note 6, at 253. See also Leary v. United States, 81 U. S. 607,
610 (1871) (first referring to the "command, possession, and control" test).
107 Crowther, supra note 6, at 254. Crowther also noted the IRS recently
adopted the FAA terminology and held that a "'wet lease' (aircraft and flight
crew) is taxable transportation, while [holding] a 'dry lease' (aircraft only) [to
be] a nontaxable rental." Id.
108 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-14-002 (Dec. 22, 1992). See also Crowther, supra
note 6, at 264.
109 Crowther, supra note 6, at 264. See also Bell, supra note 64, at 436.
110 Crowther, supra note 6, at 264.
ill Bell, supra note 64, at 436.
112 Executive Jet Aviation is the sister company of Executive Aviation Interna-
tional, infra note 172.
113 Bell, supra note 64, at 436.
114 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1466-67 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Texaco Air owned an undivided one-half interest in a Cessna aircraft.
See also Crowther, supra note 6, at 267; Bell, supra note 64, at 436.
115 I.R.C. § 4041(c) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
116 I.R.C. § 4261 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
117 Bell, supra note 64, at 436. See also Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1467.
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and rejected Executive Jet Aviation's argument that it was only
an aircraft manager, instead ruling in favor of the IRS, and held
that "as far as the NetJets program was concerned, Executive Jet
Aviation was in the 'business of transporting persons or property
for hire by air."'1"8 Consequently, the transportation tax was
properly imposed." Relying on the "substance over form" doc-
trine, the court found "negligible differences between the
NetJets aircraft interchange program and the operation of a
commercial air charter business." '119 Consequently, the "net ef-
fect [of the case is] that interest owners are required to pay
more tax than other Part 91 operators, but less tax than charter
customers."120
Although the IRS is not compelled to follow FAA principles,
Executive Jet Aviation appears to be the first case where both the
IRS and the courts could have provided a clear test around the
term "operational control" but, unfortunately, the decision pro-
vided only a vague standard. 121 Aviation and tax law scholar,
Philip Crowther, points out a significant difference in the tests
used by the IRS and the Federal Circuit.122 He notes that, al-
though they came to the same conclusion, the IRS test ex-
amined whether the "person providing the pilots has
'possession, command and control of the aircraft"' while the
court's test looked at whether that person "is using the aircraft
'in a business of transporting persons or property for compensa-
tion or hire by air.'" 23 Such a discrepancy only causes further
confusion in the body of law around fractional ownership pro-
grams. This confusion is also seen in both income and state tax
laws.
When a business involves the use of an aircraft, the IRS gener-
ally allows a deduction for the ownership and aircraft usage
costs "associated with the ownership and use of the aircraft.' '1 24
Generally, the "person entitled to tax depreciation is referred to
118 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1468-69. See also Crowther, supra note 6, at
268.
119 Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1469. See also Crowther, supra note 6, at
269; Bell, supra note 64, at 437.
120 Crowther, supra note 6, at 278.
121 Id. at 277-78.
122 Id. at 278.
123 Id. (quoting Executive Jet Aviation, 125 F.3d at 1465). See also Bell, supra note
64, at 437.
124 Crowther, supra note 6, at 279. Crowther also notes the tax laws "allow de-
duction of depreciation and other expenses related to the production of in-
come." Id. at 279 n.143. See also I.R.C. § 162 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
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as the 'tax owner' of the property" because this person is usually
the one "who suffers an economic loss by reason of the deprecia-
tion and erosion in the value of the property."1 25
In the Executive Jet Aviation decision, while the court held the
program manager must pay federal excise taxes, the court "said
nothing which would indicate that the interest owner should
not be considered the tax owner."126 Instead, income tax laws
"have treated 'joint owner[s] of property as the tax owner of
their share of the property,' and there is no indication in case
law or administrative discussion that this practice will, or should,
change."'' 27  Crowther believes that "as long as the interest
owner has the risk of loss of value on the resale of the aircraft,
the tax owner should be considered the tax owner of the aircraft
and should be entitled to claim the depreciation deduction on
the aircraft. 1 28 However, because of the differences between
excise and income taxes, fractional owners have to navigate a
system of inconsistency. 29 For example, on one hand, "the IRS
and courts have held that, although the owners technically own
the aircraft, the program manager is in control of the aircraft's
use, and thus subject to federal excise taxes."' 3 ° At the same
time, current income tax laws allow "fractional owners to deduct
depreciation of the aircraft from their income tax filings."' 31
One commentator notes that if program managers are "unable
to elicit funds paid for the excise tax from the fractional owners,
an unfair result may occur as the program manager pays taxes
for the aircraft's use but is unable to deduct any depreciation




State tax is a final area of the application of tax laws to frac-
tional ownership programs that has received some attention.
Aircraft transactions involve several state taxes including state
income tax, sales and use tax, as well as property and registra-
tion tax.'133 For example, in 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court
125 Crowther, supra note 6, at 280.
126 Id. at 284.
127 Bell, supra note 64, at 437. See also Crowther, supra note 6, at 282-83.
128 Crowther, supra note 6, at 285.
129 Bell, supra note 64, at 437-38.
130 Id. at 438.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Crowther, supra note 6, at 287. The sales and use taxes are both one-time
taxes, with both generally percentages of the purchase price. Id. The property
tax is "an annual tax on property located in the State" and the registration tax is
2007] 547
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
answered the question of whether state use taxes were expected
from fractional owners on their fractional interests in an air-
craft. ' 34 The court ultimately held that "the fractional interest
in the aircraft was tangible personal property, and therefore, the
fractional owner was subject to the use tax under Missouri
law. 1 3 5 In making its determination, the court looked at the
"sale of property" defined in the purchase agreement, the FAA's
decision that the owner (not the management company) was in
"operational control," and that a "reasonable nexus" existed be-
tween Missouri and the property. 36 But again, the law is unset-
tled because other states have reached opposite conclusions.
For example, "in Texas, the Office of the Comptroller sent out a
declaration that the program manager is 'responsible for any tax
on the purchase of the airplane."' 137 In a similar ruling, the
New York Commissioner of Taxation and Finance ruled that "a
fractional program is a non-taxable transportation service" be-
cause the aircraft was not "really sold" to a fractional owner in a
fractional program. 138 Unfortunately, different decisions revolv-
ing around the same issue of "operational control" have resulted
only in complicating precedent even further for fractional own-
ership programs.139 Further, only some states have reached the
issue of state taxes for fractional ownership programs. 4 ° Due to
unsettled questions, one commentator notes the danger that "a
lack of uniformity on this issue may lead to forum-shopping by
fractional ownership programs looking for a state tax that is eco-
nomically beneficial to their operational goals.' 4'
an "annual tax on the use of an aircraft in the State" which is "generally imposed
'in lieu of' the property tax." Id.
134 Bell, supra note 64, at 438. See also Fall Creek Const. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue,
109 S.W.3d 165, 167 (Mo. 2003).
135 Bell, supra note 64, at 438; see also Fall Creek, 109 S.W.3d at 167.
136 Bell, supra note 64, at 438.
137 Id. at 439. Bell also notes that the Comptroller's office determined "al-
though the participant provides some direction to the pilots, possession of the
aircraft remains with the seller." Id. at 439 n.64. In other words, "the participant
is contracting for a nontaxable air charter service, and a taxable sale or rental of
an aircraft to a participant does not occur." Id.
138 Bell, supra note 64, at 439. See also Crowther, supra note 6, at 308-09. How-
ever, Bell points out that the New York situation differed slightly from the NetJets
program in that while the Gap program manager performed the same duties, he
was not the initial seller of the aircraft. Bell, supra note 64, at 439 n.65.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 439-40.
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2. Securities Law Adaptations
Beyond tax laws, other areas of law have struggled to accom-
modate fractional ownership programs. For example, questions
have been raised as to the correct application of United States
securities laws to fractional ownership programs, 4 2 specifically
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 43 While securities laws are in-
tended to provide protection for people's investments in certain
enterprises, violations of the securities laws can result in civil
and criminal liability, as well as personal liability. 144 Liability
under the securities laws will only apply to an interest in a frac-
tional ownership if the interest comprises a security. 145 The an-
swer to that issue "lies in whether fractional ownership programs
are considered security investments under the Howey test cre-
ated for implementation" of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 146
The Howey Test requires the fulfillment of three elements to
subject a company to securities regulation: (1) a monetary in-
vestment; (2) a common enterprise; and (3) an "expectation of
profits derived solely from the effort of others. ' 147 All of the
elements of the Howey test are "met through the practice of
fractional ownership programs except the requirement that
there be an expectation of profits.' 1 48 This third prong is "gen-
erally not met when an investor's sole expectation is to receive
the output or use of the asset that is the subject of the invest-
ment.'1 49 Using this approach when faced with fractional own-
142 Krohn, supra note 63, at 1181.
141 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-78mm (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). Fractional owner-
ship interests may also be affected by state securities laws. Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77(a)-77(bbb) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78(a)-78(mm) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007).
144 Krohn, supra note 63, at 1182-83.
145 Id. at 1192; see also Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1475 (9th Cir. 1991).
146 Bell, supra note 64, at 447. See also Krohn, supra note 63, at 1192-93. Krohn
notes that the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the Howey test as "[A]n invest-
ment contract for purposes of the [1933 Act] means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certifi-
cates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise."
Id. (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).
147 Bell, supra note 64, at 447. See also Howey, 328 U.S. at 298; Krohn, supra note
63, at 1192-93.
148 Bell, supra note 64, at 447. See also Krohn, supra note 63, at 1199-1203.
149 Krohn, supra note 63, at 1201. Krohn distinguishes the third prong of the
Howey test by noting that "when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or
2007] 549
550 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [72
ership programs, courts must decide "who is in control of the
aircraft and whether this entity is in the 'business' of providing
transportation.' 15  The program will likely not be classified as
an investment under the securities laws if individual owners use
their fractional interest in the aircraft for personal travel.
15 1
However, if (similar to the Executive Jet Aviation decision) 152
courts find that the program is "in the business of transporting
individuals for hire," then such programs may qualify under the
securities laws. 153 Because the law is so unsettled, programs
need to be carefully structured and promoted. 154  In the
meantime, one commentator recommends: (1) agreements
should ban interest transfers;155 (2) individuals owners should
not sell or transfer "for compensation or hire their right to use
program aircraft;"' 56 (3) every effort should be made to avoid
being perceived as a "commercial enterprise;"'' l5 and (4) mar-
keting materials should stress "'use' aspects rather than any
'profit' aspects"'158 of the fractional ownership program.
3. Employment Law Adaptations
Other areas of law that have struggled to incorporate frac-
tional ownership programs include employment and tort law.
consume the item purchased . . .the securities laws do not apply." Id. at 1200.
(citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
150 Bell, supra note 64, at 447.
151 Id. See also Krohn, supra note 63, at 1210.
152 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
153 Bell, supra note 64, at 447. See also Krohn, supra note 63, at 1210-12. Krohn
argues that:
certain program structural and promotional characteristics, when
considered in the aggregate, could rise to a level that causes the
predominate attraction of the program to be financial returns,
rather than the use of the aircraft . . . IT]he program interests
could be deemed to be securities . . .because the interest in the
aircraft is subject to an agreement under which the manager is to
provide services to the participant related to the aircraft ... [and
because] the participants must hold the aircraft available for use by
others, must use an exclusive management agreement agent, and
are materially restricted in their occupancy of the aircraft. In addi-
tion, there are a number of promotional characteristics that con-
tribute to an expectation of profits.
Id.
154 Bell, supra note 64, at 447-48.
155 Krohn, supra note 63, at 1225.
156 Id. at 1225-26.
157 Id. at 1226.
158 Id. at 1227.
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Difficulties and confusion often arise because of the "common
carrier" classification. For example, under employment law, is-
sues such as "union membership, overtime pay, and flight crew
work regulations are all affected" by the unsettled nature of the
laws surrounding fractional ownership programs.15 9  For in-
stance, the National Mediation Board (the Board) approved
union representation for Executive Jet Aviation employees in
1971.160 However, this approval meant that the Board found Ex-
ecutive Jet Aviation to have "common carrier" status.' 6 ' Again,
differing approaches by various agencies clouds the waters of
classification of fractional ownership programs.
Another area of employment law affected is the application of
the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).162 Because they are classified as "common carriers,"
most commercial air carriers are exempt from these overtime
provisions under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) .163 The FLSA ex-
emption was granted to help "keep transportation moving"1 64
and lessen the likelihood of strikes. 65 Because of this exemp-
tion, employees of commercial air carriers often belong to un-
ions to guard against unfair labor practices.'66 However, if
employees do not have notice of such an exemption, they can-
not make an informed decision of whether or not to unionize
and may unwittingly leave themselves exposed. 67 In other
words, until the "common carrier" status of a fractional owner-
ship program is settled, thus establishing its place within the
FLSA provisions, fractional program employees may not know
how to proceed.
159 Bell, supra note 64, at 440.
160 Id. The National Mediation Board is the federal agency "responsible for
administering the Railway Labor Act ['RLA']. Through its certification process,
common carriers can apply for union representation through the Board. If ap-
proved, the Board then oversees collective bargaining agreements among com-
mon carriers to verify compliance with the RLA." Id.
161 Id.
162 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b)(3) (West 1998).
163 Bell, supra note 64, at 440-41. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West
1986).
164 45 U.S.C.A. § 181; Bell, supra note 64, at 444 (citing Verrett v. The Sabre
Group, 70 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (N.D. Okla. 1999)). In 1934, Congress expanded
the Railway Act to include companies that perform "transportation-related ser-
vices." Bell, supra note 64, at 444.
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The Fifth Circuit answered whether or not Executive Jet Inter-
national, creator of NetJets, was a "common carrier" under the
FLSA in Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet InternationaL168 Because Exec-
utive Jet International was a non-union fractional ownership
management company, when flight-attendants wanted compen-
sation for overtime worked on NetJets, they filed suit under a
FLSA claim.169 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court "analy-
sis, which focused on the FAA regulations and recent proposal
to keep fractional ownership programs under Part 91 of the reg-
ulations."'70 Instead, the Fifth Circuit used a test which assessed
"whether the carrier has held itself out to the public or to a de-
finable segment of the public as being willing to transport for
hire, indiscriminately."' 1  When applied to the NetJets pro-
gram, the Fifth Circuit held that Executive Jet International was
a "common carrier" as a matter of law because the court found
that Executive Jet International "defined itself through its own
marketing efforts as being willing to carry any member of that
segment of the public which it serves."'71 2 The Thibodeaux hold-
ing left the flight attendants without recourse for their overtime
worked."7 3 When considering other employment law implica-
tions, it is also important to note that crew work schedules are
further restricted under Subpart (k) of the FAA's Part 91 regula-
168 Id. See also Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir.
2003). For a complete discussion of the Thibodeaux decision and its impact on
fractional jet ownership, see Kristen Bell, Note, Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Interna-
tional: Determining Whether Fair Labor Standards Exemptions for Overtime Compensation
Apply to Fractional Ownership Programs, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 605, 605 (2004) (dis-
cussing the court's use of an "ill-suited standard" for "common carrier" classifica-
tions and the impact on the fractional ownership program industry).
169 Bell, supra note 64, at 441. See also Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 744-45. Al-
though Executive Jet International handled Part 91 and Part 135 flights, the
flight attendants that brought suit in this case spent 100 percent of their time on
Part 91 flights. Id.
170 Bell, supra note 64, at 441.
171 Id. at 442. See also Woolsey v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 518
(5th Cir. 1993). Bell notes that when asked to determine if a pilot was subject to
Part 135 regulations in Woolsey, the Fifth Circuit "looked to the nature of his
business, Premier Touring, Inc., which contracted with musicians to provide
flight transportation." Bell, supra note 64, at 442. This approach created the test
used again in Thibodeaux. Id. at 441.
172 Bell, supra note 64, at 442. Bell notes that the Thibodeaux court "also gave
significant weight to the [Board's] determination that [Executive Jet Aviation],
[Executive Jet International's] sister company, was a 'common carrier' under the
Railway Act." Id. at 442 n.83. See also Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 753.
173 Bell, supra note 64, at 442.
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tions. 17 1 The flight crew of a fractional ownership aircraft must
operate under stricter flight, duty, and rest requirements than
those of other Part 91 aircraft. 75
The classification of fractional ownership programs continues
to be vaguely defined. This lack of clarity only serves to further
confuse an already gray area of business. Given this already hazy
area of the law, it is still unclear how fractional ownership pro-
grams will interact with the requirements of the Cape Town
Treaty.
III. CAPE TOWN'S EFFECTS SINCE IMPLEMENTATION
What has been the effect of the Cape Town Treaty in the
United States since March 1, 2006? Although it is too early to
tell in many respects, one way to see the effects is to consider
what benefits were anticipated by the Treaty's drafters and early
supporters. In a speech delivered in June 2003, the United
States Department of Transportation Under Secretary of Trans-
portation Policy described the anticipated benefits as follows:
[O]nce fully implemented, [it] will ... facilitate the moderniza-
tion of airline fleets around the world. The economic benefits
will be truly global. Less-developed countries and their airlines
will be able to modernize their fleets through easier access to
aircraft at reduced financing costs. The world's skies will be safer
and cleaner as newer aircraft replace those currently in use. And
for countries that manufacture aircraft there will be increased
exports as the number of aircraft orders increases. 176
It is much too early to gauge the success of this list of advan-
tages. Many are long-term in scope and much depends on the
phrase "once fully implemented." Unidroit's website lists legal
and economic advantages as the primary global benefits of Cape
Town.17 7 Of these, Unidroit claims that the "Convention and its
174 Id. at 443.
175 Id. Bell notes that examples of stricter regulations include a requirement
that the crew take a "rest period equivalent to the total hours on duty" when
flight time exceeds ten hours. Id. Other provisions include more stringent regu-
lation of airport use and mandatory drug and alcohol testing. Id. at 443 n.91. See
also Gleimer, supra note 5, at 361-62.
176 Jeffrey N. Shane, Under Sec'y of Transp. for Policy, Dep't of Transp., Ad-
dress to the Seminar on the Cape Town Convention's Role in Facilitating Inter-
national Trade 2 (June 15, 2003), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/S-3/
Data/CapeTown%20Convention % 20Seminar%20c6-15-037.pdf.
177 Unidroit, The Advantages that States May Expect to Derive from Becoming
Contracting States to the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol (2002)
(prepared by the Secretariat of Unidroit, as Depositary), http://www.unidroit.
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protocols will greatly improve predictability as to the enforce-
ability of security, title reservation and leasing rights."'178
Unidroit also argues it "should reduce risks for creditors and
consequently borrowing costs for debtors and facilitate the ex-
tension of credit for the acquisition of high-value mobile equip-
ment, particularly in developing countries. 1 79
While hopeful, these predicted benefits are long-term and
global in effect. What about predicted effects for the United
States' domestic aviation market? One proponent of the Treaty
predicted Cape Town would bring "significant economic bene-
fits to a variety of U.S. constituencies," in part because in "coun-
tries that manufacture aircraft there likely will be increased
exports as the number of aircraft orders increases.180 Increased
exports also could mean more jobs for exporter countries such
as the United States."'' Along those lines, in a 2004 speech, the
FAA administrator agreed that "reduced costs should encourage
increased exports and export-related economic growth - not
just by major manufacturers, but also by smaller companies that
make the parts and provide related aviation services." 182 The ad-
ministrator also noted anticipated benefits to domestic financial
institutions which finance aircraft in other countries because of
the Treaty's creditor protections.8 3
Along with the benefits come a few growing pains as the
Treaty continues to affect systems already in place in the United
States. Within a month of implementation, one Connecticut at-
torney noted that the International Registry was "far from
trouble-free" and had "caused confusion, delay and consterna-
tion for buyers and sellers of aircraft."184 He cited problems
such as "delays of days and weeks in completing transactions,
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of the system work, and others caused by start-up woes in as-
signing user identities at the Registry itself."'l 5 In other cases, e-
mail providers with "strong Internet firewalls were unable to
download the digital certificates needed to authenticate their
transactions. '  Still others "tried to register only to find that
their particular make and model of aircraft was not yet listed. '" 1 7
However, once they were registered, "most users of the interna-
tional registry report that subsequent transactions have gone
smoothly."188
The Registry did have some initial hiccups, due in large part
because of the large volume of transactions that suddenly came
from the United States. In fact, an "estimated 90% of the regis-
try's transactions in the first three months [since March 1, 2006
have come] from the U.S."' 9 Niall Greene, managing director
of Aviareto Ltd. of Dublin (operators of the Registry), acknowl-
edged that some users were "annoyed by the registration pro-
cess" when the electronic International Registry initially
debuted on March 1, 2006.190 He also admitted the volume was
"considerably in excess of what had been anticipated," but that
process improvements have since sped up the process. 91
The Registry does involve the burden of additional fees and
time. For example, as noted earlier, the registration process
now involves two steps. A party must register with the FAA,
which then provides an International Registry code which must
be registered separately. In other words, now, in order to per-
fect the interest, that second code must be registered on the
International Registry's site. This requires a consensual action
in which all the parties, certainly both the grantor and grantee,
must participate. 92 As such, both must set up accounts with the
Registry and, depending on the volume at the Registry, the en-
185 Id.
186 Robert A. Searles, Working Out the Kinks at the New International Registry, Bus.
& COM. AvATION, June 1, 2006, at 106.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 James Ott, Protecting Assets: Revisions to Cape Town Treaty Registration Forthcom-
ing to Remedy Early Annoyances, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 17, 2006, at 170.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Louis M. Meiners, Jr., Cape Town Treaty Impacts Sales and Financing, AvBumR,
http://www.avbuyer.com/Articles/Article.asp?Id=345 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007)
(noting that each party must register as a "transacting user entity" and could
include as many parties as the seller, buyer, new lender, old lender, lessee, sub-
lessee, and guarantor).
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tire process could take several days.' 93 As a result, parties must
figure a delay into the process that did not exist before. As for
the increased fees, while nominal compared to the cost of an
aircraft, they also add costs that did not exist before. First, each
party to an aircraft transaction must register with either a one-
time $200 fee or $500 fee, good for five years.' 94 Additionally,
the Registry "charges registration and search fees for a subject
aircraft ranging from $35.00 to $100.00. This does not include
the increased attorney and title fees a party will incur to comply
with the Treaty's requirements. ' 1
5
Other questions remain unanswered regarding the Treaty's
impact on the United States' aviation market. For example, the
new priority system implemented by the Registry changes actual
notice to first-in-time. With fifty different jurisdictions within
the United States, ajudge may or may not recognize the interna-
tional interest in an actual notice situation. The varying deci-
sions could become very complicated and lead to lack of
certainty for aircraft purchasers. Also unknown is how global
this Treaty will actually be. So far, the United States is the only
major economic power that has fully implemented the Treaty.
Proponents claim other signatories will be ratifying soon, 1 96 but
multiple layers of international politics are in the way. For ex-
ample, if the European Union countries came in as block entity,
they would first have to make each of their own systems compati-
ble. Until additional countries with significant economic power
join, it is impossible to know what impact they will have. But the
more countries that join, the more effective the Treaty will be.
Finally, the Registry's relationship with fractional ownership
programs is in limbo. Currently, it offers no way to register so
that a joint or fractional ownership interest can be accurately
reflected.'97 Yet, the officials who drafted the Treaty clearly had
an interest in smaller corporate aircraft, given their inclusion of
aircraft seating eight people. The United States corporate air-
craft industry is especially attractive because it can provide such
a large volume of transactions for the International Registry.
193 Id.
194 Reigel, supra note 31.
195 Id.
196 Meiners, supra note 192.
197 Kent S. Jackson, Cape Town, Aviareto and You; A Word of Caution: If You Have
an Aircraft Deal in the Works, Start Looking into the New Additional Requirements Sooner
Rather Than Later Because Your Deal Will Be Affected, Bus. & COM. AVIATION, May 1,
2006, at 98; see also Searles, supra note 186, at 106.
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For example, NetJets averages a volume of 115 transactions per
month. 9 8 However, while the Registry is likely to continue to
include smaller aircraft in order to benefit from the volume it
generates, it is currently not seeing much benefit from the frac-
tional ownership programs because most are not even partici-
pating. For example, NetJets currently prohibits fractional
owners from registering their interests until the Registry pro-
vides a way to accurately reflect partial interests.'9 9 Under the
Registry's existing system, each registered interest looks like a
100 percent ownership interest which certainly clouds the title
for a fractional interest owner.2 ° °
The lack of certainty, in turn, makes both subsequent pur-
chasers and subsequent lenders uncomfortable. This makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to sell other shares while banks balk
at the title.20 1 In a few instances, NetJets has allowed interna-
tional registration if extensive paperwork accompanies the trans-
action, clearly indicating a "subordination of the international
interest. ' 20 2 In reality, the paperwork does not so much reflect a
true "subordination" as it orders the rights of the parties. 20 3 For
example, if a buyer owns a one-eighth interest and is allowed to
register on the International Registry, all his paperwork must
show that he gives the program manager a superior right to the
remaining seven-eighths. NetJets notes that officials are claim-
ing that the Registry will modify its electronic system to accom-
modate fractional interests by April of this year.2 °4 If this
happens, NetJets plans to offer Cape Town registration for every
fractional owner.20 5 In the meantime, the current rule of thumb
is that major fractional ownership programs do not participate
in the Cape Town International Registry, and fractional owner-
ship is only reflected in the FAA registry.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD
Every change comes with a period of adjustment. Following
that trite, but true, statement is the truism that every system can
198 Telephone interview with Amanda Applegate, Vice President of Contract
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be improved upon. The Cape Town Treaty is no exception.
One of the most repeated complaints concerning the Treaty has
been the delays it has caused, especially with aircraft bought and
sold with the intention of domestic use only. Since the Treaty
was aimed primarily at large international aircraft transactions,
it is significant that smaller domestic transactions have been ad-
versely affected.
One commentator notes that the Treaty "contained an elec-
tion for each adopting country to exempt internal transactions"
but that the United States chose not to do so.2 06 Possibly, Con-
gress might choose to make such an exemption in the future.
In fact, a 2006 article quoted Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe,
as saying he is considering introducing legislation to "exempt
aircraft weighing 100,000 pounds or less or with thirty seats or
less from the burdens of the implementing act."2 °7 But is this a
feasible solution that everyone will accept?
Given the volume and revenue generated by the smaller cor-
porate aircraft, that solution is likely to meet with stiff opposi-
tion. However, the legislature could come up with some sort of
compromise. One such compromise might involve the corpo-
rate aircraft industry (fractional ownership programs as well as
general corporate craft) agreeing to participate, but as a block
constituent. In other words, the legislature could come up with
a certain size requirement, such as the one suggested by Senator
Inhofe above. Sellers of qualifying aircraft, as well as fractional
ownership programs, could elect to collectively participate in
the Cape Town Treaty, but in a subcategory. Regular FAA regis-
tration would still be observed. But instead of immediately filing
another Cape Town registration, participants in this new subcat-
egory would maintain a file of these newly registered owners in
their own records. On a monthly or bimonthly basis, the partici-
pants would then file a bulk registration with the International
Registry on behalf of their clients, as part of the cost and service
of the airplane transaction. For fractional ownership programs,
this could be included in the Management Agreement and left
up to the program manager to implement for a fee. Ideally the
extra steps of Cape Town would become invisible to the clients
and delays would cease.
In order for this subcategory to be viable, several aspects
would have to be amended for this special subcategory. First,
206 Meiners, supra note 192.
207 Jackson, supra note 197, at 98.
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the cost of the altered system would have to be paid by someone.
To justify the time and effort of maintaining a subcategory, par-
ticipating programs would need to pay a yearly fee. This fee
would then likely be passed on to the customers, along with the
original filing fees. Unfortunately this plan adds costs to the sys-
tem. However, in all likelihood, the fees would only be several
hundred dollars at most. In the context of a multimillion dollar
purchase of an aircraft, an increase of even several hundred dol-
lars is not very consequential. Parties would hopefully view this
as a cost of efficiency and be willing to pay. Another aspect of
the International Registry that would have to be amended for
the new subcategory is the bilateral aspect of the registration.
Instead of having both parties register at the same time, the In-
ternational Registry would need to allow subcategory members
to register interests on behalf of their clients, possibly with the
aid of electronically-scanned signed agreements. Finally, the
priority rules of the International Registry must change for this
type of subcategory solution. With a month (or longer) between
registrations, the priority rule could not be first-in-time for sub-
category participants. Rather, the subcategory could adopt the
FAA priority rules that favor actual notice. Ideally, the subcat-
egory would allow United States registrants to rely first on FAA
filings for priority, however this would be a more difficult con-
cession for the Cape Town Treaty, given the priority rules for all
other aircraft.
Another possible recommendation for improving Cape Town
implementation for domestic aircraft would require making the
FAA registration more than an entry point. In other words, the
legislature could decide to let the aircraft industry, already fa-
miliar and comfortable with the FAA registration process, con-
tinue to only file a registration with the FAA. The FAA
registration could then be linked to the International Registry
so that the filings could occur simultaneously. Fees could still
be paid to each, but also simultaneously, through one portal.
This would completely erase the added delays caused by the ad-
ditional requirements imposed by the International Registry.
While the priority rules would still be at odds, they could simply
co-exist as they already do.
Additionally, specific modifications for fractional ownership
aircraft could only help the Cape Town implementation, given
the fact that most fractional programs do not currently partici-
pate at all. As one NetJets executive notes, fractional ownership
programs are "not new to designing systems" within existing sys-
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tems.2 °8 The first improvement the internet site needs is the ad-
dition of an option to correctly reflect an owner's fractional
interest. This improvement alone would likely encourage most,
if not all, fractional ownership programs to begin participation.
A simple drop-down menu with the ability to reflect specific per-
centages would suffice. However, to further encourage frac-
tional ownership program participation, Cape Town needs to
provide fractional owners with more incentives. Right now, the
Treaty is so focused on large international transactions that
there is little incentive for domestic participation, much less for
fractional ownership programs. In addition, the legislature
could opt to financially support the domestic small aircraft in-
dustry's compliance with the Treaty. The federal government
could sponsor a special program for small aircraft owners who
meet specified size requirements and either (1) only finance
and use their aircraft domestically or (2) participate in joint or
fractional ownership programs. As part of this program, in or-
der to provide similar financing incentives and benefits to the
ones enjoyed by international transactions of larger aircraft, the
federal government could subsidize loans for purchasers of
smaller, domestic craft who comply with Cape Town.
The Cape Town Treaty is a part of the United States aviation
landscape. The entire aviation industry is adjusting to the new
requirements and the process is improving daily. Additionally,
the industry is cognizant of the challenges faced by the smaller,
corporate aircraft owners. As a result, they are looking for solu-
tions to ease the adoption of Cape Town. As parties to aircraft
transactions become more knowledgeable about the new re-
quirements, the process will only improve. Although improve-
ments are still needed for the domestic market, the Cape Town
Treaty does offer global benefits. In order to support the goals
of global efficiency and international market stability, the fed-
eral government should provide incentives to put the domestic
and corporate aviation market on more equal footing with the
larger aircraft carriers. Once that happens, the Treaty's benefits
will truly be realized, both internationally and domestically.
208 Interview with Amanda Applegate, supra note 198.
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